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ABSTRACT: It is well known that while there is a strong correlation between adoption of ICTs
and economic growth there is also a corresponding strong correlation between the adoption of
ICTs and increased ICT-related technological threats that can have severe economic and other
negative consequences. Within this context cybersecurity has become a major issue in both
“developed” and “developing” countries, with humans being considered the “weakest link in
the chain” of system security. While the cybersecurity literature has previously explored
constructs such as awareness and self-efficacy to explain cybersecurity compliance behavior,
there has been no exploration of the impacts of individuals’ decision styles on cybersecurity
related compliance behavior and some other antecedents of such behavior. In this paper we
address this issue using an exploratory approach and present a causal model for consideration
in future research.
Keywords: Decision Style, Cybersecurity Compliance Behavior, Decision Tree, General Security
Orientation, Awareness, Self-efficacy
1. INTRODUCTION
The Jamaican Government (GoJ), in its National Development Plan – Vision 2030 – posits that to
achieve one of its national goals, sustainable development, by 2030, among other things, it has
to create a technology-enabled society (Planning Institute of Jamaica 2009). The expectation of
the GoJ is that increased adoption of technology will boost productivity, efficiency and propel
socio-economic growth.

This vision is realistic; research in other jurisdictions have

demonstrated the correlation between information and communication technology (ICT)
adoption and growth in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (Amiri and Reif 2013; UNCTAD
2006).

However, increased adoption of ICTs is positively correlated with increased technological
threats and economic loss. For instance, during a single six month period, January – June 2016,
electronic fraud alone costs the Jamaican economy some $500 million (Williams 2016) and the
WannaCry ransomware attack in May 2017 affected more than 300,000 victims in over 150
countries (McAfee Labs 2017), negatively impacting citizens and disrupting business operations
around the globe.

To cope with these technological or cybersecurity threats, security

stakeholders have: i) implemented technology-based protection solutions; and ii) conducted
cybersecurity awareness activities for users, recognizing that users’ are a key threat to
achieving security because they often fail to adhere to the security best practices. Humans are
often considered the “weakest link in the chain” of system security (Sasse and Flechais 2005;
Warkentin and Willison 2009).
To improve users’ security compliance behavior, the literature emphasizes the need for
managers and practitioners to focus on awareness initiatives (D’Arcy et al. 2009; Herath and
Rao 2009; Puhakainen and Siponen 2010). The idea is that awareness mechanisms such as
posters, bulletins and newsletters can act as reminders to users to take appropriate securityrelated actions. However there is a scarcity of empirical studies that examine the direct link
between security awareness and users’ compliance behavior. Stanton (2005) reported that
through increased awareness measures, users changed passwords more frequently and chose
better passwords. Too, Bulgurcu et al. (2010) provide empirical evidence that general security
awareness (GSAW) exerts significant influence on a user’s attitude toward compliance. Donalds
(2015) also provides empirical support for the link between security awareness and compliance
behaviour. Of note however, is that these studies examined security awareness in different but
related contexts. For instance, D’Arcy et al. (2009) examined the role of user awareness in
relation to information system (IS) misuse while Herath and Rao (2009) examined the influence
of security awareness on employees’ compliance with the organization’s information security
policy (ISP). Bulgurcu et al. (2010) also examined the influence of security awareness on
employees’ compliance with the organization’s ISP, however, security awareness was
conceptualized as having two key dimensions: “general security awareness” and “information

policy awareness”. Donalds (2015) examined the influence of users’ general awareness of
cybersecurity threats on compliance behaviour. Even though there is some evidence that the
direct link between security awareness and compliance behavior is significant, work in the area
is still limited and fragmented. As a result, we wish to examine further the role of general
security awareness in shaping users’ compliance behavior in the cybersecurity context. Security
compliance behavior in the cybersecurity context is hereafter referred to synonymously as
cybersecurity compliance behavior.
A construct that has been incorporated, but has gained little attention in the IS domain is
general security orientation (GSOR). According to Ng et al. (2009), general security orientation
is an individual’s predisposition and interest concerning practicing computer security and is
analogous to general health orientation of the health belief model. General health orientation
captures the individual’s tendency towards performing healthy behaviors.

Since it has been

observed that individuals with higher levels of health awareness have exhibited greater levels
of healthcare behaviors (Jayanti and Burns 1998), it is reasonable to theorize that individuals
with greater predisposition towards computer security should exhibit higher levels of security
compliance behavior. While the results of Ng et al’s. (2009) study did not find that GSOR is a
direct predictor of security compliance behavior, it found that perceived severity moderated
the effects of GSOR on security compliance behaviour. That is, when the perceived severity of a
security threat is severe or great, then the individual who has a higher level of predisposition
towards security will be more proactive in practicing computer security. These results (no
direct but indirect relationship between GSOR and compliance behavior) warrant further
investigation. In this study we aim to improve our understanding of the influence of GSOR on
compliance behavior by examining the relationship between GSOR and security compliance
behavior in the cybersecurity context.
Another factor that has been cited to influence users’ behavior is self-efficacy (SLEF). SLEF is a
construct of protection motivation theory and emphasizes an individual’s ability or judgment of
his or her ability to perform an action (Bandura 1977). More specifically, the theory suggests
that increasing individual’s SLEF can improve their competence in coping with a task. For

instance, in a training course SLEF was found to exert a strong influence on individual’s
performance with computer use (Compeau and Higgins 1995). Recent empirical security
studies show that SLEF has a significant effect on users’ intention to comply with (Bulgurcu et
al. 2010; Herath and Rao 2009; Pahnila et al. 2010) as well as their attitude toward security
compliance (Herath and Rao 2009). Few other studies have studied the role of SLEF on users’
compliance behavior (Chan et al. 2005; Ng et al. 2009) and have found the link between SLEF
and compliance behavior significant. While prior research focused mainly on the effects of SLEF
on users’ intention to comply or general security behavior, this study seeks to examine the
influence of SLEF on users’ self-reported actual cybersecurity compliance behaviour. According
to theories such as theory of reasoned action (TRA) (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Fishbein and
Ajzen 1975) and technology acceptance model (TAM)(Davis 1989), an individual’s behavior is
driven by their behavioral intentions, that is, actual behavior is mediated by behavioral
intention. This study differs from others in that we examine the direct relationship between
SLEF and actual compliance behavior and not users’ intention to comply.
In order to improve the cybersecurity behaviors of users, it is necessary to understand the
security behavior of men and women and the differences and/or similarities in their compliance
behavior. In general, gender has been shown to have a profound influence on an individual’s
perceptions, attitudes and performance (Nosek et al. 2002). Studies in the security literature
also found that gender is significantly correlated with employees’ security compliance intention
and behavior. For instance, research shows that females have a higher policy compliance
intention than males (Herath and Rao 2009; Ifinedo 2012) and that habitual IS security
compliance and personal factors, such as gender, influences employees security behavior
(Vance et al. 2012). Too, Anwar et al. (2017) found that females reported lower cybersecurity
scores than males. Further, Anwar et al. (2017) reported significant difference between males
and females on security self-efficacy; this suggests that men and women have differences in
their perceived computer abilities. Consequently, we argue that studying the role that gender
plays with respect to cybersecurity compliance behavior of users is warranted.

While the cybersecurity literature has previously explored constructs such as awareness and
self-efficacy to explain cybersecurity compliance behavior, there has been no exploration of the
impacts of individuals’ decision styles on cybersecurity related compliance behavior and some
other antecedents of such behavior. In this study we examine such impacts. Cognitive
theorists have long argued that decision style is an important determinant of behavior. In fact,
several investigations (e.g. Henderson and Nutt 1980; Niu 2013) report that an individual’s
decisions seem to be a function of the individual’s cognitive makeup, which differs for
psychological types. The Decision Styles Inventory (DSI) tool (Rowe and Boulgarides 1983;
Rowe and Mason 1987), that is adopted in this study, has been used in varying setting to test
the relationship between individual decisions styles and behaviour. For instance, Moretti
(1994) used the tool to classify volunteers as typical or not typical leaders and found that typical
leaders deal better with ambiguity and uncertainty; Jamian et al. (2013) explored how decision
styles of deans in institutions of higher education relate to leadership effectiveness. To the best
of our knowledge, decision styles have not been investigated in previous security or
cybersecurity studies.
In this paper we explore the impacts of individuals’ decision styles on their cybersecurity
compliance behavior and on other constructs theorized to influence security compliance
behavior. Subsequent sections present an overview of individuals’ decision styles, the research
methodology, results of the interactions of decision styles on behavior and antecedents of
behavior, abduction of hypotheses for future testing and conclusion.
2. OVERVIEW ON INDIVIDUAL DECISION STYLES
The Decision Style Inventory (DSI) was developed by Rowe in 1981 and further elaborated by
Rowe & Boulgarides (1983) and Rowe & Mason (1987) is a cognitive management tool to
understand the type of decisions an individual is likely to make under certain situations. Rowe
and Boulgarides (1992) argued that effective decision-makers are the ones whose decision style
matches the requirements of the decision situations. Thus, a better understanding about one’s
likely behavior or decisions can help not only the individuals but their organizations in more

strategic decision-making. Within the context of the decision styles model there are four
decision styles (Directive, Analytical, Conceptual, and Behavioral) each with its own
characteristics with regards to level of tolerance for ambiguity, need for structure, people or
task orientation and so on (see Table 1).
Table 1: Decision Styles
Style
Description
Achievement oriented without the need for external rewards; enjoys problem
solving; strong ability to cope with new situations; oriented towards acquiring
and utilizing all relevant information; make decisions slowly because of
Analytical
orientation to examine the situation thoroughly and consider many alternatives
systematically; prefer information that is given in the form of written reports.

Behavioral

Strong people orientation, driven primarily by a need for affiliation; typically
receptive to suggestions, willing to compromise, and prefer loose controls; have
short-range focus; comfortable making decisions using limited relevant
information; prefer to do their information exchange at meetings.

Conceptual

Achievement and people oriented with the need for external rewards; have
long-range focus; make decisions slowly because of orientation to examine the
situation thoroughly and consider many alternatives systematically.

Directive

Results and power oriented but have al low tolerance for ambiguity and cognitive
complexity; prefer to consider a small number of alternatives based on limited
information; prefer structure and information that is given verbally; have shortrange focus.

Martinsons and Davison (2007) observed that in different cultures, different individual decision
styles are dominant, and that these differences determine the types of decision support system
that are most appropriate. For example they noted that in several non-Western societies,
decision-makers “focus on collective interests, emphasize relationships and intuition (at the
expense of factual analysis), and discourage conflicting views that would threaten group
harmony or the face of the individual”, with some having “greater acceptance of tacit
knowledge management”. To paraphrase Martinsons and Davison (2007), for such non-Western
societies, Knowledge Management Systems (KMSs) that support interpersonal communications
and encourage tacit knowledge sharing and individual discretion would be more helpful than
KMSs that mainly involve codified knowledge.

Elicitation of decision styles information is done using a standard DSI questionnaire (Rowe
1981; Rowe and Mason 1987), that consists of 20 multi-response questions. For each question
there is a set of 4 response statements, one for each of the four decision styles, and the
respondent is required to rank the set of response statements: Most Preferred (8 points), 2 nd
Most Preferred (4 points), 3rd Most Preferred (2 points), Least Preferred (1 points). This implies
that for each question, 15 points have to be distributed across the 4 response statements.
Therefore the overall maximum number of points is 300; and overall maximum possible
number of points for each decision style is 160 (= 20* 8), with the corresponding minimum
being 20 (= 20*1).
ScoreAnalytical + ScoreBehavioral + ScoreConceptual + ScoreDirectivel = 300

Idea/Action Orientation:
An individual can also be characterized as having a preference for acting (i.e. Action-oriented)
or thinking (Idea-oriented). Given a decision-making task, an Idea-oriented individual is
predisposed to first engage in deep analysis and synthesis before acting, formulate creative and
innovative solutions, and engage in written communication. The Action-oriented individual on
the other hand is predisposed to focus on the achievement of results, feeling internal pressure
to act he/she may engage in inadequate reflection before acting (Rowe and Mason 1987).
Determination of the Idea/Action Orientation of the individual can also be defined in terms of
the 4 elementary individual decision styles. An individual would be categorized as being Ideaoriented if his/her combined score for the Analytical and Conceptual decision styles was at least
170; otherwise the he/she would be characterized as being Action-oriented (combined score
for the Behavioral and Directive decision styles was at least 130).

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
For this research we adapted the steps from the methodology presented by Osei-Bryson and
Ngwenyama (2011) and included an additional step, “Exploratory Factor Analysis”. In general,

this methodology employs the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) process for theory development, on
which positivist IS research is based (see Figure 1). The process can be described as cyclical
with theory formulation generally resulting from empirical observations and from formulated
theory, hypotheses generation, which are subsequently tested and used to inform empirical
observations. According to Osei-Bryson and Ngwenyama (2011), the general limitation of the
H-D model is that hypotheses generation are limited by human imagination. Osei-Bryson and
Ngwenyama (2011) demonstrate that this limitation can be overcome by incorporating data
mining techniques such as decision tree generation. Applying the H-D process to this study, we
formulate theory based on empirical observations and then generate hypotheses using decision
tree technique, which can then be subjected to testing.

Figure 1: Hypothetico-deductive (H-D) model

The following outlines the steps from the methodology presented by Osei-Bryson and
Ngwenyama (2011):
1. Use existing theory to select potential direct and indirect predictor variables for security
compliance behavior.
2. Collect relevant data.
3. Conduct exploratory factor analysis.
4. Use decision tree induction technology to do recursive partitioning of the given dataset
resulting in rulesets.

5. Abduct hypotheses from the results of the decision tree induction. Sibling rules hypotheses
will be generated using the approach presented in Osei-Bryson & Ngwenyama (2011).

3.1 Overview on Decision Tree Induction
A decision tree (DT) is a tree structure representation of the given decision problem such that
each non-leaf node is associated with one of the decision variables, each branch from a nonleaf node is associated with a subset of the values of the corresponding decision variable, and
each leaf node is associated with a value of the target (or dependent) variable. There are two
main types of DTs: 1) classification trees and 2) regression trees. For a classification tree, the
target variable takes its values from a discrete domain, and for each leaf node the DT associates
a probability for each class (i.e. value of the target variable). A regression tree (RT) is a DT in
which the target variable takes its values from a continuous domain (numeric). For each leaf,
the RT associates the mean value and the standard deviation of the target variable.

There are two major phases of the RT induction process: the growth phase and the pruning
phase (e.g. Kim and Koehler, 1995). The growth phase involves a recursive partitioning of the
training data resulting in a RT such that either each leaf node is pure (i.e. all observations have
the same value for the target), further partitioning of the given leaf would result in at least one
of its child nodes being below some specified threshold, or the split is not statistically significant
at a specified level. The pruning phase aims to generalize the RT that was generated in the
growth phase by generating a sub-tree that avoids over-fitting to the training data. The actions
of the pruning phase is often referred to as post-pruning in contrast to the pre-pruning that
occurs during the growth phase and which aims to prevent splits that do not meet certain
specified threshold (e.g. minimum number of observations for a leaf).

In order to reduce over-fitting the generated RT to the data that was used to generate it, for
large modeling datasets, the original dataset would be divided into mutually exclusive Training
and Validation subsets, where the Training subset is used during the Growth Phase to generate
the initial RT, and the Validation subset would be used during the Post-Pruning phase. For small

modeling datasets, such an approach is not possible so techniques such as k-fold cross
validation (e.g. 10-fold) are used where the original model dataset is divided into k mutually
exclusive subsets (k-folds), and k runs are done each in involving a unique combination of (k-1)
folds.
During the Growth Phase, the given dataset is recursively split into smaller and smaller datasets
based on the selected splitting method. A splitting method is the component of the DT
induction algorithm that determines both the attribute that is selected for a given node of the
DT and also the partitioning of the values of the selected attribute into mutually exclusive
subsets such that each subset uniquely applies to one of the branches that emanate from the
given node. It is well known that there is no single splitting method that will give the best
performance for all datasets. While some datasets are insensitive to the choice of splitting
methods, other datasets are very sensitive to the choice of splitting methods. Given that it is
never known beforehand which splitting method will lead to the best DT for a given dataset, it
is advisable that the data miner explore the effects of different splitting methods (e.g. Variance
Reduction, F-Test).

3.2 Sibling Rules Hypotheses
Nodes that share the same parent are considered to be Sibling Nodes (see Figure 2). For each
set of Sibling Nodes there is a corresponding set of Sibling Rules and an associated
discriminating variable (e.g. DominantOrientation). Sibling Rules Hypotheses are formed based
on the discriminating variable associated with a given set of Sibling Rules, and its test
worthiness is evaluated by applying traditional statistical hypothesis testing to the statistics of
the target variables that are associated with pairs of Sibling Nodes (Osei-Bryson and
Ngwenyama 2011; Osei-Bryson and Ngwenyama 2014).

For example given the pair of Sibling Rules that are associated with Nodes 2 and 3 the following
hypotheses and its alternative hypothesis would be formed and its test worthiness evaluated.

HO:

The difference in the mean value of the target variable that is associated with

Orientation = ‘Action’ from that associated with Orientation = ‘Idea’ is not statistically
significant.
HA:

The difference in the mean value of the target variable that is associated with

Orientation = ‘Action’ from that associated with Orientation = ‘Idea’ is statistically
significant.

Figure 2. Examples of Sibling Nodes & Sibling Rules
o Node 2 & Node 3 are child nodes of
Node 1 so are Sibling Nodes with
DominantOrientation being the
discriminating variable.
The corresponding Sibling Rules are:
 IF DominantOrientation =
‘Action’ THEN the target
variable has an Average value
of 2.9013 & StdDev of 1.0142
 IF DominantOrientation =
‘Idea’ THEN the target variable
has an Average value of 3.6600
with StdDev of 0.9496
o Nodes 4, 5 & 6 are child nodes of
Node 2 so are Sibling Nodes with
DominantDS being the discriminating
variable

In this case its test worthiness would be evaluated using a difference of means statistical test
since the target variable has the interval data type; if the target variable had a discrete data
type then its test worthiness would be evaluated using a difference of proportions statistical
test. If the p-value is below the specified level of significance then the hypothesis HO is rejected
and its alternative hypothesis HA is not rejected. For this example the corresponding p-value is
0.0006, and so HO is rejected and its alternative hypothesis HA is not rejected. Since there is only

a single pair of Sibling Rules then there is need to evaluate only a single null hypotheses and
since it HO is rejected then the Sibling Rules Hypothesis is formed based on HA:
Orientation has a statistically significant impact on the given target variable.
In general, if the parent node has more than 2 child nodes then multiple (HO, HA) pairs would
need to be evaluated, as demonstrated in section 4.

4. APPLICATION OF THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Step 1: Selection of Potential Predictor Variables
Table 2. List of Constructs – Dependent Variable & Potential Predictors
Construct

Password
Compliance
Behavior

Security
Compliance
Behavior

General
Security
Awareness

General
Security

Factor
Label

PWDC

SECC

GSAW

GSOR

Items
CMPB1 – I use different passwords for my
different online accounts (e.g., online
banking/shopping, Facebook, email).
CMPB2 – I have changed the passwords to
access my different online accounts (e.g.,
online banking/shopping, Facebook, email)
during the past 12 months.
CMPB5 – I never usually send sensitive
information (such as account numbers,
passwords, and ID numbers via email or using
social media.
CMPB6 – Concerns about security issues made
me visit only websites I know/trust or click on
URLs if I know where the URLs will really take
me.
CMPB7 – Concerns about security issues made
me not open emails from people I don’t know
and/or only use my own computer.
GSAW1 – Overall, I am aware of potential
information/cyber security threats and their
negative consequences.
GSAW2 – I understand the concerns regarding
information/cyber security threats and the
risks they pose in general.
GSAW2 – I have sufficient knowledge about
the cost of potential information/cyber
security threats.
GSOR1 – I read information/cyber security
bulletins or newsletters.

Reference
Anwar et al. (2017)

Special Eurobarometer
390
(2012)
Anwar et al. (2017)

Anwar et al. (2017);
Special Eurobarometer
390
(2012)
Special Eurobarometer
390
(2012)
Bulgurcu et al. (2010)

Bulgurcu et al. (2010)

Bulgurcu et al. (2010)

Ng et al.
(2009)

Construct

Factor
Label

Orientation

Self-Efficacy

SLEF

Items
GSOR2 – I am concerned about
information/cyber security incidents and try to
take actions to prevent them.
GSOR3 – I am usually mindful about computer
security.
SLEF2 – I feel confident updating security
patches to the operating system.
SLEF3 – I feel confident setting the Web
browser to different security levels.
SLEF4 – I feel confident using different
programs to protect my information and
information system.
SLEF5 – I feel confident handling virus infected
files and/or getting rid of malware/spyware.
SLEF6 – I feel confident learning the method
to protect my information and information
system.

Reference
Ng et al.
(2009)
Ng et al.
(2009)
Rhee et al. (2009); Anwar
et al. (2017);
Rhee et al. (2009); Anwar
et al. (2017);
Rhee et al. (2009)

Rhee et al. (2009); Anwar
et al. (2017);
Rhee et al. (2009)

Step 2: Data Collection
We collected data via a web-based survey, which was pre-tested by faculty members, graduate
students as well as some IS security experts, all from Jamaica. Based on feedback, several items
were reviewed and modified.

The survey instrument was then used to collect data from

faculty members, undergraduate and graduate students in an institution of higher learning and
from employed individuals across industries in Jamaica. In order to elicit participation, the
survey link was sent to all members in one faculty and students of several undergraduate and
graduate courses. Additionally, participants were asked to forward the survey link to potential
participants known to them. This type of technique wherein people make referrals to identify
other participants is referred to as “snowball sampling”. Because the snowball sampling
technique was incorporated to elicit participation, it is difficult to establish the sample frame
for the study. Nonetheless, the link was directly advertised to approximately 370 individuals, of
which 105 responses were received. Without considering referrals, this yields a response rate
of 28%. Of the 105 participants in the survey, 56 percent were females and 44 percent males.
Too, respondents of the survey were from varying industries, such as: education, banking and
financial services, telecommunications/IT and the security services.

Step 3: Exploratory Factor Analysis
From the exploratory factor analysis of the four potential predictor and determinant variables
(security compliance behavior, security awareness, general security orientation and security
self-efficacy), five factors emerged to explain the maximum portion of the variance in the
original variables (see Tables 3 and 4). That is, five factors explained approximately 65 percent
of variance in the original variables (see Table 3). Table 4 identifies the five factors. Of note,
the items of the original security compliance behavior variable loaded unto two factors:
components 3 and 4. Based on the items, the two factors are now identified as “Security
Compliance Behavior” (SECC) and “Password Compliance Behavior” (PWDC) (see Table 2).
Factors can be identified by the factors loadings. That is, to interpret factors, the factor
loadings are examined to determine the strength of the relationships or explain the variance
explained by the items on that particular factor. One widely utilized approach is to keep items
with high factor loadings and discard low ones. As a rule of thumb, items with factor loadings
of 0.6 or higher can be retained for exploratory studies (Matsunaga 2010; Nunally 1967). Due
mostly to low factor loadings as well as cross loadings, three items (CMPB3, CMPB4, CMPB8)
were removed (see Table 4).
Table 3: Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigenvalues
Component

Total

Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings

% of Variance

Cumulative %

Total

% of Variance

Cumulative %

1

7.07

35.34

35.34

7.07

35.34

35.34

2

1.93

9.64

44.98

1.93

9.64

44.98

3

1.5

7.52

52.5

1.5

7.52

52.5

4

1.32

6.58

59.07

1.32

6.58

59.07

5

1.18

5.91

64.98

1.18

5.91

64.98

6

1.09

5.46

70.44

1.09

5.46

70.44

7

0.86

4.31

74.75

8

0.74

3.69

78.44

9

0.65

3.27

81.72

10

0.58

2.89

84.6

11

0.51

2.53

87.13

12

0.48

2.39

89.52

13

0.41

2.04

91.56

Initial Eigenvalues
Component

Total

% of Variance

Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Cumulative %

14

0.38

1.88

93.44

15

0.28

1.38

94.82

16

0.26

1.3

96.13

17

0.25

1.24

97.37

18

0.22

1.08

98.46

19

0.18

0.91

99.36

20

0.13

0.64

100

Total

% of Variance

Cumulative %

Table 4: Rotated Component Matrix
Component
Item

1

2

3

4

5

6

CMPB1

0.17

0.11

0.79

0.11

0.18

0.01

CMPB2

0.01

0.09

0.85

0.05

0.01

0.01

CMPB5

0.07

0.12

0.25

0.66

-0.31

0.07

CMPB6

0.15

-0.04

0.2

0.71

0.32

-0.01

CMPB7

0.02

0.25

-0.13

0.78

0.15

0.02

GSAW1

0.15

0.86

0.02

0.16

0.13

0.02

GSAW2

0.16

0.87

0.16

0.16

0.07

-0.01

GSAW3

0.29

0.6

0.18

-0.02

0.36

-0.01

GSOR1

0.33

0.06

0.07

0.01

0.77

-0.02

GSOR2

0.23

0.2

0.09

0.07

0.74

0.06

GSOR3

0.21

0.37

0.19

0.25

0.65

0.21

SLEF1

0.44

0.3

-0.12

0.31

0.33

0.04

SLEF2

0.89

0.06

0.09

0.06

0.1

-0.02

SLEF3

0.88

0.1

0.05

0.04

0.24

0.02

SLEF4

0.81

0.18

0.14

0

0.24

0.05

SLEF5

0.78

0.17

0.04

0.06

0.1

0.16

SLEF6

0.62

0.2

0.11

0.25

0.24

0.24

CMPB3

0.45

0.17

0.44

0.05

0.19

0.45

CMPB4

0.32

0.19

0.17

0.19

0.32

0.62

CMPB8

-0.01

0.11

0.07

0.05

0.06

-0.85

Step 4: Decision Tree Induction
To generate a DT from a given dataset, a single variable must be identified as the target (or
dependent) variable and the potential predictors must be identified as the input variables.

Commercial data mining software (e.g. C5.0, SAS Enterprise Miner, IBM Intelligent Miner)
provide facilities that make the generation of DTs a relatively easy task. In our case the SAS
Enterprise Miner data mining software was applied to this dataset, resulting in the RTs that are
displayed in Figures 3 - 7. Since our dataset is small we used 10-fold cross validation. We set the
maximum number of splits per node to 4; the minimum number of observations associated
with a rule to 10; and since our dataset is small, we such as k-fold cross validation with k= 3.

4.1 Impact Decision Styles and Orientation on GSOR:
This DT provides evidence that the individual’s dominant Decision Style (i.e. DominantDS) may
have a statistically significant impact on his/her general security orientation (GSOR) at the 5%
level of significance since at least one of the corresponding pairs of (Ho, HA) hypotheses has a HA
that is “accepted” (see Table 5).
Figure 3. DT with GSOR as the Target Variable
Potential Predictors
o DominantDS
o DominantOrientation
o Gender

Resulting DT

Table 5. Evaluation of (HO, HA) pairs associated with DT where GSOR is the Target Variable
Pair Null Hypothesis HO
1 HO: The difference in the mean value of GSOR that is associated
with DominantDS = ‘A’ from that associated with DominantDS =
‘B’ or ‘D’ is not statistically significant.
2 HO: The difference in the mean value of GSOR that is associated
with DominantDS = ‘C’ from that associated with DominantDS =
‘B’ or ‘D’ is not statistically significant.

p-value
0.0011

Accept HA
Yes

0.0511

No

4.2 Impact of Decision Styles and Orientation on GSAW:
This DT provides evidence that the individual’s dominant Decision Style (i.e. DominantDS) may
have a statistically significant impact on his/her general security awareness (GSAW) at the 5%
level of significance since at least one of the corresponding pairs of (Ho, HA) hypotheses has a HA
that is “accepted” (see Table 6).
Figure 4. DT with GSAW as Target Variable
Potential Predictors
o DominantDS
o DominantOrientation
o Gender

Resulting DT

Table 6. Evaluation of (HO, HA) pairs associated with DT where GSAW is the Target Variable
Pair Null Hypothesis HO
p-value
1 HO: The difference in the mean value of GSAW that is associated
0.0043
with DominantDS = ‘A’ from that associated with DominantDS =
‘B’ or ‘D’ is not statistically significant.
2 HO: The difference in the mean value of GSAW that is associated
0.1393
with DominantDS = ‘C’ from that associated with DominantDS =
‘B’ or ‘D’ is not statistically significant.

Accept HA
Yes

No

4.3 Impact of Decision Styles and Orientation on SLEF:
This DT provides evidence that: The individual’s dominant Idea/Action Orientation (i.e.
DominantOrientation) may have a statistically significant impact on his/her self-efficacy (SLEF)
at the 5% level of significance since its corresponding (Ho, HA) pair of hypotheses has a HA that is
“accepted” (see Table 7).
Figure 5. DT with SLEF as Target Variable
Potential Predictors
o DominantDS
o DominantOrientation
o Gender

Resulting DT

Table 7. Evaluation of (HO, HA) pairs associated with DT where SLEF is the Target Variable
Pair Null Hypothesis HO
3.1 HO: The difference in the mean value of SLEF that is associated
with DominantOrientation = ‘Action’ from that associated with
DominantOrientation = ‘Idea’ is not statistically significant.

p-value
0.0006

Accept HA
Yes

4.4 Impact of Decision Styles and Orientation on SECC:
The resulting DT displayed below provides evidence that the individual’s dominant Decision
Style (i.e. DominantDS)

may have a statistically significant impact on his/her security

compliance behavior (SECC) at the 5% level of significance since its corresponding (Ho, HA) pair
of hypotheses has a HA that is “accepted” (see Table 8).

Figure 6. DT with SECC as Target Variable
Input Potential Predictor Variables
o SLEF
o GSOR
o GSAW
o DominantDS
o DominantOrientation
o Gender

Resulting DT

Table 8. Evaluation of (HO, HA) pair associated with DT where SECC is the Target Variable
Pair Null Hypothesis HO
4.1 HO: The difference in the mean value of SECC that is associated
with DominantDS = (‘A’ or ‘C’) from that associated with
DominantDS = (‘B’ or ‘D’) is not statistically significant.

p-value
0.0004

Accept HA
Yes

4.5 Impact of Decision Styles and Orientation on PWDC:
The resulting DT does not include DominantDS or DominantOrientation in its rules and does not
provide evidence that either variable has a statistically significant impact on his/her password
compliance behavior (PWDC).
Figure 7. DT with PWDC as Target Variable
Potential Predictors

Resulting DT

o SLEF
o GSOR
o GSAW
o DominantDS
o DominantOrientation
o Gender

Step 5: Abduction of Hypotheses
Given the alternative hypotheses (i.e. HAs) that were accepted in Step 4, the following
hypotheses can be abducted:
Table 9: Abducted Hypotheses
Hypothesis
DominantDS  GSOR

Test Worthiness
p-value = 0.0011

Justification
Informed Argument
Since some decision styles (DS) give
more emphasis to the use of data in
decision-making then security issues

DominantDS  GSAW
DominantOrientation  SLEF

p-value = 0.0043
p-value = 0.0006

DominantDS  SECC

p-value = 0.0004

such as data integrity, availability and
confidentiality may be of greater
concern to individuals with those DSs.
Similar to the above.
SLEF emphasizes an individual’s ability
or judgment of his or her ability to
perform an action (Bandura 1977).
Given characteristics of Idea-orientation
vs Action –orientation it seems
reasonable that DominantDS impacts
SLEF.
DS is a predictor of decision behavior
and action (Rowe and Boulgarides,
1992)

Kositanurit et al. (2011) proposed a hybrid process for empirically based theory development
that is described in Table 10 below. Given the abducted hypotheses displayed in Table 9 and
hypotheses proposed in other previous research, Table 11 displays a set of relevant causal links
(i.e. hypotheses) along with their justifications, of a new extended model that could be
empirically tested in future search. Further, figure 8 provides the new research model that has
emerged from our analyses and which can be subjected to empirical testing.

Table 10. Model of Process for Empirically based Theory Development
Ideal Model of Scientific Inquiry
Phase
Description
Empirical
Observer (gather data about) some
Observation
phenomena of interest.

Hypothesis
Generation

Using these observations (data)
invent one or more hypotheses that
might explain the phenomena.

Hybrid Process for Empirically based Theory
Development
1a: Use existing theory to identify variables that
are likely to be relevant to the phenomena of
interest.
1b: Based on Substep 1a above, gather data
related to the phenomena of interest.
2a: Use data mining approach to do automatic
generation & preliminary testing of hypotheses
2b: Based on the results of Substep 2a,
generate a preliminary model that appears to
explain the phenomena of interest.
2c: The researcher examines & of necessary
revised the preliminary model that was
generated in Substep 2b. This revision may be
based on the researcher’s knowledge of
existing theory.

Design of
Experiments

Using the hypotheses, design an
experiment to test the logical
consequences of the hypotheses.

Empirical
Testing

Having designed the experiment,
collect observations about the
phenomena and examine them to
see if the predictions prove to be
true or false.

Figure 8. Future Research Model

3: Design an experiment to test the logical
consequences of the hypotheses.
Conventional data analysis approaches may be
included in the experimental design.
4a: Collect observations about the phenomena.
4b: Conduct measurement validity.
4c: Determine if hypotheses of the current
model are supported based on data analysis of
the given dataset
This phase should be repeated since no amount
of testing can ever guarantee the truth value of
a theory about phenomena but only gradually
increasing confirmation of the theory.

Table 11. Hypotheses of Extended Model
Causal Link
DominantDS  GSOR
DominantDS  GSAW
DominantOrientation  SLEF
DominantDS  SECC
SLEF  SECC
GSOR  SECC
GSAW  SECC
SLEF  PWDC
GSOR  PWDC
GSAW  PWDC

Justification
Abducted in this study
Abducted in this study
Abducted in this study
Abducted in this study
Chan et al. (2005); Ng et al. (2009)
Ng et al. (2009); (Jayanti and Burns 1998)
Stanton (2005); Bulgurcu et al. (2010); Donalds (2015)
Chan et al. (2005); Ng et al. (2009)
Ng et al. (2009); (Jayanti and Burns 1998)
Bulgurcu et al. (2010); Donalds (2015)

5. CONCLUSION
It is the hope of the GoJ that the continued adoption if ICTs, among other things, will lead to
sustainable economic growth.

While this vision can be realized, there is a direct correlation

between ICT adoption and cybersecurity threats. Additionally, since individuals are considered
the “weakest link in the chain” of IS security, it is an imperative of the GoJ and other
organizations to identify factors that can positively influence users’ security compliance
behavior.

The purpose of this paper is to identify factors that influence users’ security compliance
behavior. We accomplish this by: i) considering the effects that decision styles may have on
security compliance behavior; and ii) employing the H-D process for theory development.
Specifically, we used a data mining based exploratory data analysis approach to abduct some
new hypotheses. For future research, one possible direction is to empirically validate these
constructs and abducted relationships. By identifying and understanding the determinants of
users’ security compliance behavior, interventions can be designed to change behavior by
directing same at one or more of the determinants.
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